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National Emergency Powers
Summary
The President of the United States has available certain powers that may be
exercised in the event that the nation is threatened by crisis, exigency, or emergency
circumstances (other than natural disasters, war, or near-war situations).  Such
powers may be stated explicitly or implied by the Constitution, assumed by the Chief
Executive to be permissible constitutionally, or inferred from or specified by statute.
Through legislation, Congress has made a great many delegations of authority in this
regard over the past 200 years.
There are, however, limits and restraints upon the President in his exercise of
emergency powers.  With the exception of the habeas corpus clause, the Constitution
makes no allowance for the suspension of any of its provisions during a national
emergency.  Disputes over the constitutionality or legality of the exercise of
emergency powers are judicially reviewable.  Indeed, both the judiciary and Congress,
as co-equal branches, can restrain the executive regarding emergency powers.  So can
public opinion.  Furthermore, since 1976, the President has been subject to certain
procedural formalities in utilizing some statutorily delegated emergency authority.
The National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1601-1651) eliminated or modified some
statutory grants of emergency authority, required the President to declare formally the
existence of a national emergency and to specify what statutory authority, activated
by the declaration, would be used, and provided Congress a means to countermand
the President’s declaration and the activated authority being sought.  The
development of this regulatory statute and subsequent declarations of national
emergency are reviewed in this report, which is updated as events require.
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National Emergency Powers
Federal law provides a variety of powers for the President to use in response to
crisis, exigency, or emergency circumstances threatening the nation.  Moreover, they
are not limited to military or war situations.  Some of these authorities, deriving from
the Constitution or statutory law, are continuously available to the President with little
or no qualification.  Others—statutory delegations from Congress—exist on a stand-
by basis and remain dormant until the President formally declares a national
emergency.  These delegations or grants of power authorize the President to meet the
problems of governing effectively in times of crisis.  Under the powers delegated by
such statutes, the President may seize property, organize and control the means of
production, seize commodities, assign military forces abroad, institute martial law,
seize and control all transportation and communication, regulate the operation of
private enterprise, restrict travel, and, in a variety of ways, control the lives of United
States citizens.  Furthermore, Congress may modify, rescind, or render dormant such
delegated emergency authority.
Until the crisis of World War I, Presidents utilized emergency powers at their
own discretion.  Proclamations announced the exercise of exigency authority.
However, during World War I and thereafter, Chief Executives had available to them
a growing body of standby emergency authority which became operative upon the
issuance of a proclamation declaring a condition of national emergency.  Sometimes
such proclamations confined the matter of crisis to a specific policy sphere, and
sometimes they placed no limitation whatsoever on the pronouncement.  These
activations of stand-by emergency authority remained acceptable practice until the era
of the Vietnam war.  In 1976, Congress curtailed this practice with the passage of the
National Emergencies Act.
Background and History
The exercise of emergency powers had long been a concern of the classical
political theorists, including the eighteenth-century English philosopher John Locke,
who had a strong influence upon the Founding Fathers in the United States.  A
preeminent exponent of a government of laws and not of men, Locke argued that
occasions may arise when the executive must exert a broad discretion in meeting
special exigencies or “emergencies” for which the legislative power provided no relief
or existing law granted no necessary remedy.  He did not regard this prerogative as
limited to wartime, or even to situations of great urgency.  It was sufficient if the
“public good” might be advanced by its exercise.1
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Emergency powers were first expressed prior to the actual founding of the
Republic.  Between 1775 and 1781, the Continental Congress passed a series of acts
and resolves which count as the first expressions of emergency authority.2  These
instruments dealt almost exclusively with the prosecution of the Revolutionary War.
At the Constitutional Convention of 1787, emergency powers, as such, failed to
attract much attention during the course of debate over the charter for the new
government.  It may be argued, however, that the granting of emergency powers by
Congress is implicit in its Article I, section 8 authority to “provide for the common
Defense and general Welfare,” the commerce clause, its war, armed forces, and militia
powers, and the “necessary and proper” clause empowering it to make such laws as
are required to fulfill the executions of “the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers
vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any
Department or Officer thereof.”
There is a tradition of constitutional interpretation that has resulted in so-called
implied powers, which may be invoked in order to respond to an emergency situation.
Locke seems to have anticipated this practice.  Furthermore, Presidents have
occasionally taken an emergency action which they assumed to be constitutionally
permissible.  Thus, in the American governmental experience, the exercise of
emergency powers has been somewhat dependent upon the Chief Executive’s view
of the presidential office.  
Perhaps the President who most clearly articulated a view of his office in
conformity with the Lockean position was Theodore Roosevelt.  Describing what
came to be called the “stewardship” theory of the presidency, Roosevelt wrote of his
“insistence upon the theory that the executive power was limited only by specific
restrictions and prohibitions appearing in the Constitution or imposed by the Congress
under its constitutional powers.”  It was his view “that every executive officer, and
above all every executive officer in high position, was a steward of the people,” and
he “declined to adopt the view that what was imperatively necessary for the Nation
could not be done by the President unless he could find some specific authorization
to do it.”  Indeed, it was Roosevelt’s belief that, for the President, “it was not only his
right but his duty to do anything that the needs of the Nation demanded unless such
action was forbidden by the Constitution or by the laws.”3
Opposed to this view of the presidency was Roosevelt’s former Secretary of
War, personal choice for, and actual successor as Chief Executive, William Howard
Taft.  He viewed the presidential office in more limited terms, writing “that the
President can exercise no power which cannot be fairly and reasonably traced to some
specific grant of power or justly implied and included within such express grant as
proper and necessary to its exercise.”  In his view, such a “specific grant must be
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either in the Federal Constitution or in an act of Congress passed in pursuance
thereof.  There is,” Taft concluded, “no undefined residuum of power which he can
exercise because it seems to him to be in the public interest ....4
Between these two views of the presidency lie various gradations of opinion,
resulting in perhaps as many conceptions of the office as there have been holders.
One authority has summed up the situation in the following words:
Emergency powers are not solely derived from legal sources.  The extent of their
invocation and use is also contingent upon the personal conception which the
incumbent of the Presidential office has of the Presidency and the premises upon
which he interprets his legal powers.  In the last analysis, the authority of a
President is largely determined by the President himself.5
Finally, apart from the Constitution, but resulting from its prescribed procedures,
there are statutory grants of power for emergency conditions.  The President is
authorized by Congress to take some special or extraordinary action, ostensibly to
meet the problems of governing effectively in times of exigency.  Sometimes these
laws are only of temporary duration.  The Economic Stabilization Act of 1970, for
example, allowed the President to impose certain wage and price controls for about
three years before it expired automatically in 1974.6  The statute gave the President
emergency authority to address a crisis in the nation’s economy.
Of course, many of these laws are continuously maintained or permanently
available for the President’s ready use in responding to an emergency.  The Defense
Production Act, originally adopted in 1950 to prioritize and regulate the manufacture
of military material, is exemplary of this type of statute.7
Lastly, there are various stand-by laws which convey special emergency powers
once the President formally declares a national emergency activating them.  In 1973,
a Senate special committee studying emergency powers published a compilation
identifying some 470 provisions of federal law delegating to the executive
extraordinary authority in time of national emergency.8  The vast majority of them are
of the stand-by kind—dormant until activated by the President.  However, formal
procedures for invoking these authorities, accounting for their use, and regulating
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their activation and application were established a while ago by the National
Emergencies Act of 1976.9
The Emergency Concept
Relying upon constitutional authority or congressional delegations made at
various times over the past 200 years, the President of the United States may exercise
certain powers in the event that the continued existence of the nation is threatened by
crisis, exigency, or emergency circumstances.  What is a national emergency?
In the simplest understanding of the term, the dictionary defines an emergency
as “an unforeseen combination of circumstances or the resulting state that calls for
immediate action.”10  In the midst of the crisis of the Great Depression, a 1934
Supreme Court majority opinion characterized an emergency in terms of urgency and
relative infrequency of occurrence as well as equivalence to a public calamity resulting
from fire, flood, or like disaster not reasonably subject to anticipation.11  An eminent
constitutional scholar, the late Edward S. Corwin, explained emergency conditions
as being those “which have not attained enough of stability or recurrency to admit of
their being dealt with according to rule.”12  During congressional committee hearings
on emergency powers in 1973, a political scientist described an emergency in the
following terms:  “It denotes the existence of conditions of varying nature, intensity
and duration, which are perceived to threaten life or well-being beyond tolerable
limits.”13  Corwin also indicated it “connotes the existence of conditions suddenly
intensifying the degree of existing danger to life or well-being beyond that which is
accepted as normal.”14
There are perhaps at least four aspects of an emergency condition.  The first is
its temporal character: an emergency is sudden, unforeseen, and of unknown duration.
The second is its potential gravity: an emergency is dangerous and threatening to life
and well-being.  The third, in terms of governmental role and authority, is the matter
of perception: who discerns this phenomenon?  The Constitution may be guiding on
this question, but not always conclusive.  Fourth, there is the element of response: by
definition, an emergency requires immediate action, but is, as well, unanticipated and,
therefore, as Corwin notes, cannot always be “dealt with according to rule.”  From
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these simple factors arise the dynamics of national emergency powers.15  These
dynamics can be seen in the history of the exercise of emergency powers.
Law and Practice
During the summer of 1792, residents of western Pennsylvania, Virginia, and the
Carolinas began forcefully opposing the collection of a federal excise tax on whiskey.
Anticipating rebellious activity, Congress enacted legislation providing for the calling
forth of the militia to suppress insurrections and repel invasions.16  Section 3 of this
statute required that a presidential proclamation be issued to warn insurgents to cease
their activity.17  If hostilities persisted, the militia could be dispatched.  On August 17,
1794, President Washington issued such a proclamation.  The insurgency continued.
The President then took command of the forces organized to put down the rebellion.18
Here was the beginning of a pattern of policy expression and implementation
regarding emergency powers.  Congress legislated extraordinary or special authority
for discretionary use by the President in a time of emergency.  In issuing a
proclamation, the Chief Executive notified Congress that he was making use of this
power and also apprised other affected parties of his emergency action.
Over the next 100 years, Congress enacted various permanent and standby laws
for responding largely to military, economic, and labor emergencies.  During this span
of years, however, the exercise of emergency powers by President Abraham Lincoln
brought the first great dispute over the authority and discretion of the Chief Executive
to engage in emergency actions.  
By the time of Lincoln’s inauguration (March 4, 1861), seven states of the lower
South had announced their secession from the Union; the Confederate provisional
government had been established (February 4, 1861); Jefferson Davis had been
elected (February 9, 1861) and installed as president of the confederacy (February 18,
1861); and an army was being mobilized by the secessionists.  Lincoln had a little over
two months to consider his course of action.
When the new President assumed office, Congress was not in session.  For
reasons of his own, Lincoln delayed calling a special meeting of the legislature, but
soon ventured into its constitutionally designated policy sphere.  On April 19, he
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issued a proclamation establishing a blockade on the ports of the secessionist states,19
“a measure hitherto regarded as contrary to both the Constitution and the law of
nations except when the government was embroiled in a declared, foreign war.”20
Congress, of course, had not been given an opportunity to consider a declaration of
war.
The next day, the President ordered the addition of 19 vessels to the navy “for
purposes of public defense.”21  A short time later, the blockade was extended to the
ports of Virginia and North Carolina.22
By a proclamation of May 3, Lincoln ordered that the regular army be enlarged
by 22,714 men, that navy personnel be increased by 18,000, and that 42,032
volunteers be accommodated for three-year terms of service.23  Such a directive, of
course, antagonized many Representatives and Senators, because Congress is
specifically authorized by Article I, Section 8, of the Constitution “to raise and
support armies.”
In his July message to the newly assembled Congress, Lincoln suggested that,
while his actions with regard to the expansion of the armed forces might be legally
suspect, “[t]hese measures, whether strictly legal or not, were ventured upon under
what appeared to be a popular and a public necessity, trusting then, as now, that
Congress would readily ratify them.  It is believed,” he wrote, “that nothing has been
done beyond the constitutional competency of Congress.”24
Indeed, Congress subsequently did legislatively authorize, and thereby approve,
the President’s actions regarding his increasing armed forces personnel, and would do
the same later concerning some other questionable emergency actions.  In the case of
Lincoln, the opinion of scholars and experts is “that neither Congress nor the Supreme
Court exercised any effective restraint upon the President.”25  The emergency actions
of the Chief Executive were either unchallenged or approved by Congress, and were
either accepted or, because of almost no opportunity to render judgment, went largely
without notice by the Supreme Court.  The President made a quick response to the
emergency at hand, a response which Congress or the courts might have rejected in
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law, but which, nonetheless, had been made in fact and with some degree of popular
approval.  Similar controversy would arise concerning the emergency actions of
Presidents Woodrow Wilson and Franklin D. Roosevelt.  Both men exercised
extensive emergency powers with regard to world hostilities, and Roosevelt also used
emergency authority to deal with the Great Depression.  Their emergency actions,
however, were largely supported by statutory delegations and a high degree of
approval on the part of both Congress and the public.
Furthermore, during the Wilson and Roosevelt presidencies, a major procedural
development occurred in the exercise of emergency powers—use of a proclamation
to declare a national emergency and thereby activate all stand-by statutory provisions
delegating authority to the President during a national emergency.  The first such
national emergency proclamation was issued by President Wilson on February 5,
1917.26  Promulgated on the authority of a statute establishing the United States
Shipping Board, the proclamation concerned water transportation policy.27  It was
statutorily terminated, along with a variety of other wartime measures, on March 3,
1921.28
President Franklin D. Roosevelt issued the next national emergency proclamation
some 48 hours after assuming office.29  Proclaimed March 6, 1933, on the somewhat
questionable authority of the Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917,30 the proclamation
declared a so-called “bank holiday” and halted a major class of financial transactions
by closing the banks.  Congress subsequently gave specific statutory support for the
Chief Executive’s action with the passage of the Emergency Banking Act on March
9.31  Upon signing this legislation into law, the President issued a second banking
proclamation, based upon the authority of the new law, continuing the bank holiday
until it was determined that banking institutions were capable of conducting business
in accordance with new banking policy.32
Next, on September 8, 1939, President Roosevelt promulgated a proclamation
of “limited” national emergency, though the qualifying term had no meaningful legal
significance.33  Almost two years later, on May 27, 1941, he issued a proclamation of
“unlimited” national emergency.34  This action, however, actually did not make any
important new powers available to the Chief Executive in addition to those activated
by the 1939 proclamation.  The President’s purpose in making the second
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proclamation was largely to apprise the American people of the worsening conflict in
Europe and growing tensions in Asia.
These two war-related proclamations of a general condition of national
emergency remained operative until 1947, when certain of the provisions of law they
had activated were statutorily rescinded.35  Then, in 1951, Congress terminated the
declaration of war against Germany.36  In the spring of the following year, the Senate
ratified the treaty of peace with Japan.  Because these actions marked the end of
World War II for the United States, legislation was required to keep certain
emergency provisions in effect.  Initially, the Emergency Powers Interim Continuation
Act temporarily maintained this emergency authority.37  It was subsequently
supplanted by  the Emergency Powers Continuation Act, which kept selected
emergency delegations in force until August 1953.38  By proclamation in April 1952,
President Harry S. Truman terminated the 1939 and 1941 national emergency
declarations, leaving operative only those emergency authorities continued by
statutory specification.39
President Truman’s 1952 termination, however, specifically exempted a
December 1950 proclamation of national emergency he had issued in response to
hostilities in Korea.40  Furthermore, this condition of national emergency would
remain in force and unimpaired well into the era of the Vietnam war.
Two other proclamations of national emergency also would be promulgated
before Congress once again turned its attention to these matters.  Faced with a postal
strike, President Richard M. Nixon declared a national emergency in March 1970,41
thereby gaining permission to use units of the Ready Reserve to assist in moving the
mail.42  A second national emergency was proclaimed by President Nixon in August
1971 to control the balance of payments flow by terminating temporarily certain trade
agreement provisos and imposing supplemental duties on some imported goods.43
Congressional Concerns
In the years following the conclusion of U.S. armed forces involvement in active
military conflict in Korea, occasional expressions of concern were heard in Congress
regarding the continued existence of President Truman’s 1950 national emergency
proclamation long after the conditions prompting its issuance had disappeared.  There
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was some annoyance that the President was retaining extraordinary powers intended
only for a time of genuine emergency, and a feeling that the Chief Executive was
thwarting the  legislative intent of Congress by continuously failing to terminate the
declared national emergency.44  
Growing public and congressional displeasure with the President’s exercise of
his war powers and deepening U.S. involvement in hostilities in Vietnam prompted
interest in a variety of related matters.  For Senator Charles Mathias, interest in the
question of emergency powers developed out of U.S. involvement in Vietnam and the
incursion into Cambodia.  Together with Senator Frank Church, he sought to establish
a Senate special committee to study the implications of terminating the 1950
proclamation of national emergency that was being used to prosecute the Vietnam
war, “to consider problems which might arise as the result of the termination and to
consider what administrative or legislative actions might be necessary.”  Such a panel
was initially chartered by S.Res. 304 as the Special Committee on the Termination of
the National Emergency in June of 1972, but did not begin operations before the end
of the year.45 
With the convening of the 93rd Congress in 1973, the special committee was
approved again with S.Res. 9.  Upon exploring the subject matter of national
emergency powers, however, the mission of the special committee became more
burdensome.  There was not just one proclamation of national emergency in effect,
but four such instruments, issued in 1933, 1950, 1970, and 1971.  The United States
was in a condition of national emergency four times over, and with each proclamation,
the whole collection of statutorily delegated emergency powers was activated.
Consequently, in 1974, with S.Res. 242, the study panel was rechartered as the
Special Committee on National Emergencies and Delegated Emergency Powers to
reflect its focus upon matters larger than the 1950 emergency proclamation.  Its final
mandate was provided by S.Res. 10 in the 94th Congress, although its termination date
was necessarily extended briefly in 1976 by S.Res. 370.  Senator Church and Senator
Mathias co-chaired the panel.46
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The special committee produced various studies during its existence.47  After
scrutinizing the United States Code and uncodified statutory emergency powers, the
panel identified 470 provisions of federal law which delegated extraordinary authority
to the executive in time of national emergency.  Not all of them required a declaration
of national emergency to be operative, but they were, nevertheless, extraordinary
grants.  The special committee also found that no process existed for automatically
terminating the four outstanding national emergency proclamations.  Thus, the panel
began developing legislation containing a formula for regulating emergency
declarations in the future and otherwise adjusting the body of statutorily delegated
emergency powers by abolishing some provisions, relegating others to permanent
status, and continuing others in a standby capacity.  In addition, the panel also began
preparing a report offering its findings and recommendations regarding the state of
national emergency powers in the nation.
The National Emergencies Act
The special committee, in July 1974, unanimously recommended legislation
establishing a procedure for the presidential declaration and congressional regulation
of a national emergency.  The proposal also modified various statutorily delegated
emergency powers.  In arriving at this reform measure, the panel consulted with
various executive branch agencies regarding the significance of existing emergency
statutes, recommendations for legislative action, and views as to the repeal of some
provisions of emergency law.
This recommended legislation was introduced by Senator Church for himself and
others on August 22, 1974, and became S. 3957.  It was reported from the Senate
Committee on Government Operations on September 30 without public hearings or
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amendment.48   The bill was subsequently discussed on the Senate floor on October
7, when it was amended and passed.49
Although a version of the reform legislation had been introduced in the House
on September 16, becoming H.R. 16668, the Committee on the Judiciary, to which
the measure was referred, did not have an opportunity to consider either that bill or
the Senate adopted version due to the press of other business—chiefly the
impeachment of President Nixon and the nomination of Nelson A. Rockefeller to be
Vice President of the United States.  Thus, the National Emergencies Act failed to be
considered on the House floor before the final adjournment of the 93rd Congress.
With the convening of the next Congress, the proposal was introduced in the
House on February 27, 1975, becoming H.R. 3884, and in the Senate on March 6,
becoming S. 977.  House hearings occurred in March and April before the
Subcommittee on Administrative Law and Governmental Relations of the Committee
on the Judiciary.50  The bill was subsequently marked-up and, on April 15, was
reported in amended form to the full committee on a 4-0 vote.  On May 21, the
Committee on the Judiciary, on a voice vote, reported the bill with technical
amendments.51  During the course of House debate on September 4, there was
agreement to both the committee amendments and a floor amendment providing that
national emergencies end automatically one year after their declaration unless the
President informs Congress and the public of a continuation.  The bill was then passed
on a 388-5 yea and nay vote and sent to the Senate, where it was referred to the
Committee on Government Operations.52
The Senate Committee on Government Operations held a hearing on H.R. 3884
on February 25, 1976,53  The bill was subsequently reported on August 26 with one
substantive and several technical amendments.54  The following day, the amended bill
was passed and returned to the House.55  On August 31, the House agreed to the
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56 Ibid., Aug. 31, 1976, p. 28466.
57 90 Stat. 1255; 50 U.S.C. 1601-1651 (1988); see U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on
Government Operations and Special Committee on National Emergencies and Delegated
Emergency Powers, The National Emergencies Act (Public Law 94-412).  Source Book:
Legislative History, Texts, and Other Documents, committee print, 94th Cong., 2nd sess.
(Washington: GPO, 1976).
58 See Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
59 See 99 Stat. 405, 448.
Senate amendments,56 clearing the proposal for President Gerald Ford’s signature on
September 14.57
As enacted, the National Emergencies Act consisted of five titles.  The first of
these generally returned all standby statutory delegations of emergency power,
activated by an outstanding declaration of national emergency, to a dormant state two
years after the statute’s approval.  However, the act did not cancel the 1933, 1950,
1970, and 1971 national emergency proclamations because these were issued by the
President pursuant to his Article II constitutional authority.  Nevertheless, it did
render them ineffective by returning to dormancy the statutory authorities they had
activated, thereby necessitating a new declaration to activate standby statutory
emergency authorities.
Title II provided a procedure for future declarations of national emergency by
the President and prescribed arrangements for their congressional regulation.  The
statute established an exclusive means for declaring a national emergency.
Furthermore, emergency declarations were to terminate automatically after one year
unless formally continued for another year by the President, but could be terminated
earlier by either the President or Congress.  Originally, the prescribed method for
congressional termination of a declared national emergency was a concurrent
resolution adopted by both houses of Congress.  This type of so-called “legislative
veto” was effectively invalidated by the Supreme Court in 1983.58  The National
Emergencies Act was amended in 1985 to substitute a joint resolution as the vehicle
for rescinding a national emergency declaration.59
When declaring a national emergency, the President must indicate, according to
Title III, the powers and authorities being activated to respond to the exigency at
hand.  Certain presidential accountability and reporting requirements regarding
national emergency declarations were specified in Title IV, and the repeal and
continuation of various statutory provisions delegating emergency powers was
accomplished in Title V.
Since the 1976 enactment of the National Emergencies Act, various national
emergencies, identified in Table I, have been declared pursuant to its provisions.
Some were subsequently revoked, while others remain operative.  All declarations
made pursuant to the National Emergencies Act are identified in Table I; their
cancellation is noted, where appropriate; and a Code of Federal Regulations or
Federal Register citation is provided to enable examination of their full text.
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Table 1.  Declared National Emergencies, 1976-2001
Declaration Date Title CFR Citation


























































Declaration Date Title CFR Citation
E.O. 12808 05/30/92 Blocking “Yugoslav
Government” Property
































E.O. 12934 10/25/94 Blocking Property and
Additional Measures
With Respect to the
Bosnian Serb-Controlled









E.O. 12947 01/23/95 Prohibiting Transactions
with Terrorists Who













Declaration Date Title CFR Citation






Proc. 6867 03/01/96 Regulation of the
Anchorage and
Movement of Vessels
with Respect to Cuba
3 C.F.R., 1996
Comp., pp. 8-9.












































66 Fed. Reg. 7389-
7390.
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Declaration Date Title CFR Citation
60 U.S. Congress, Senate Special Committee on National Emergencies and Delegated
Emergency Powers, National Emergencies and Delegated Emergency Powers, p. 19.
61 Ibid., p. 10.
E.O. 13222 08/17/01 Continuation of Export
Control Regulations
66 Fed. Reg. 44025-
44026.




66 Fed. Reg. 48197-
48199.






66 Fed. Reg. 49079-
49082.
a  Revoked by E.O. 12451 of Dec. 20, 1983.
b  Revoked by E.O. 12525 of July 12, 1985. 
c  Revoked by E.O. 12707 of Mar. 13, 1990.
d  Revoked by E.O. 12769 of July 10, 1991.
e  Revoked by E.O. 12710 of Apr. 5, 1990.
f  Revoked by E.O. 12867 of Sept. 30, 1993.
g  Revoked by E.O. 12938 of Nov. 11, 1994.
h  Revoked by E.O. 12932 of Oct. 14, 1994.
i  Revoked by E.O. 12930 of Sept. 29, 1994.
J  Revoked by E.O. 12924 of Aug. 19, 1994.
k Revoked by E.O. 13206 of April 4, 2001.
l  Revoked by E.O. 12938 of Nov. 14, 1994.
m Revoked in part by E.O. 12959 of May 6, 1995.
In its final report, issued in late May 1976, the special committee concluded “by
reemphasizing that emergency laws and procedures in the United States have been
neglected for too long, and that Congress must pass the National Emergencies Act
to end a potentially dangerous situation.”60  The panel’s recommended legislation, of
course, was enacted into law before the end of the year.
Other issues identified by the special committee as deserving attention in the
future, however, did not fare so well.  The panel, for example, was hopeful that
standing committees of both houses of Congress would review statutory emergency
power  provisions within their respective jurisdictions with a view to the continued
need for, and possible adjustment of, such authority.61  Actions in this regard probably
were not as ambitious as the special committee expected.  A title of the Federal Civil
Defense Act of 1950, granting the President or Congress power to declare a civil
defense emergency in the event an attack on the United States occurred or was
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62 See 50 U.S.C. App. 2297 (1970); U.S. Congress, House Committee on Armed Services,
Extending Civil Defense Emergency Authorities, 93rd Cong., 2nd sess., H.Rept. 93-1243
(Washington: GPO, 1974); Associated Press, “Rules Panel Halts Bill on War Powers,”
Washington Post, Sept. 19, 1974, p. A5. 
63 90 Stat. 517; 10 U.S.C. 12302
64 10 U.S.C. 673 (1970).
65 50 U.S.C. 1701-1706.
66 91 Stat. 1625.
67 12 U.S.C. 95a and 50 U.S.C. App. 5(b) (1976).
68Of related interest to these statutory developments, President Ford, by a proclamation of
February 19, 1976, gave notice that E.O. 9066, providing for the internment of Japanese-
Americans in certain military areas during World War II, was canceled as of the issuance of
the proclamation formally establishing the cessation of World War II on December 31, 1946.
See 3 C.F.R., 1976 Comp., pp. 8-9.  Certain statutory authority relevant to this executive
order, concerning the creation of military areas and zones, was canceled by the National
Emergencies Act.  See 18 U.S.C. 1383 (1976).
anticipated, expired in June 1974 after the House Committee on Rules failed to report
a measure continuing the statute.62  
A provision of emergency law was refined in May 1976.  Legislation was enacted
granting the President the authority to order certain selected members of an armed
services reserve component to active duty without a declaration of war or national
emergency.63  Previously, such an activation of military reserve personnel had been
limited to a “time of national emergency declared by the President” or “when
otherwise authorized by law.”64
Another refinement of emergency law occurred in 1977 when action was
completed on the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA).65  Reform
legislation containing this statute66 modified a provision of the Trading with the
Enemy Act of 1917, authorizing the President to regulate the nation’s international
and domestic finance during periods of declared war or national emergency.67  The
enacted bill limited the President’s Trading with the Enemy Act power to regulate the
country’s finances to times of declared war.  In IEEPA, a provision conferred
authority on the Chief Executive to exercise controls over international economic
transactions in the future during a declared national emergency and established
procedures governing the use of this power, including close consultation with
Congress when declaring a national emergency to activate IEEPA.  Such a declaration
would be subject to congressional regulation under the procedures of the National
Emergencies Act.68
      
Other matters identified in the final report of the special committee for
congressional scrutiny included:
! investigation of emergency preparedness efforts conducted by the executive
branch;
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69 See U.S. Congress, Senate Special Committee on National Emergencies and Delegated
Emergency Powers, National Emergencies and Delegated Emergency Powers, pp. 11-18.
70 See, for example, U.S. Congress, House Committee on Government Operations,
Presidential Directives and Records Accountability Act, hearing, 100th Cong., 2nd sess., Aug.
3, 1988  (Washington: GPO, 1989; U.S. Congress, House Committee on Interior and Insular
Affairs, Emergency Preparedness and the Licensing Process for Commercial Nuclear Power
Reactors, 2 parts, hearings, 98th Cong., 1st sess., Apr. 18 and July 8, 1983 (Washington:
GPO, 1985).
! attention to congressional preparations for an emergency and continual review
of emergency law;
! ending open-ended grants of authority to the executive;
! investigation and institution of stricter controls over delegated powers; and
! improving the accountability of executive decisionmaking.69
There is some public record indication that certain of these points, particularly
the first and the last, have been addressed in the past two decades by congressional
overseers.70  
Conclusion
The development, exercise, and regulation of emergency powers, from the days
of the Continental Congress to the present, reflect at least one highly discernable
trend: those authorities available to the executive in time of national crisis or exigency
have, since the time of the Lincoln Administration, come to be increasingly rooted in
statutory law.  The discretion available to a Civil War President in his exercise of
emergency power has been harnessed, to a considerable extent, in the contemporary
period.  Furthermore, due to greater reliance upon statutory expression, the range of
this authority has come to be more circumscribed, and the options for its use have
come to be regulated procedurally through the National Emergencies Act.  Since its
enactment, however, the National Emergencies Act has not been revisited by
congressional overseers.  Nonetheless, as the final report of the Senate Special
Committee on National Emergencies suggests, the prospect remains that further
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